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I. INTRODUCTION
"The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."1
The United States Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange
modifies a patent holder's absolute right to exclude to a non-absolute right to
exclude, thus vacating the Federal Circuit's long-standing policy of
automatically enjoining infringing defendants in patent cases.2 Effectively,
the Court abrogated this once well-established property rule entitling a
patent holder to an absolute right to exclude and, in its stead, institutes a rule
of liability. This paradigm shift should appropriately impact all areas of the
patent system for three reasons: the eBay decision (1) effectively stops the
proliferation of "patent trolls"; (2) permits inventors to pursue technologies
they may have been priced out of otherwise; and (3) provides a
discretionary, four-factor test for the lower courts to apply. As such, this
new rule should ultimately "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience" for years
to come.
II. THE FBAY DECISION
A. The Background and Procedural History of the Litigation
MercExchange patented a business method for a computerized market
designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals.' The idea
behind MercExchange's method is that participants in the computerized
market can speculate as to the cost of the item, bid on the item, and thus
change the price of the item.4 A centralized authority supervises the
exchange of goods and promotes trust amongst participants.5 MercExchange
sought to license its patent to eBay, but negotiations broke down and no
agreement was reached.6  MercExchange subsequently brought an
infringement suit against eBay in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
I U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
2 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
3 Id. at 1839.
4 Id.
5 Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995).
6 See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
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District ofVirginia.7 Thejury found that MercExchange had a valid patent,
that eBay had infringed that patent, and that damages were an appropriate
remedy.'
Following the verdict, MercExchange moved the district court for a
permanent injunction, alleging irreparable harm if the district court did not
grant an injunction as eBay would continue to infringe on its intellectual
property rights.9 The court refused to grant a permanent injunction, 10
reasoning that MercExchange's willingness to license its patents, its lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments to the media
reflecting its intent to collect damages from eBay instead of enjoining them,
were sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm."
The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that absent exceptional
circumstances, courts should issue permanent injunctions in patent cases
once an infringement has been found.'2 It concluded that the trial court did
not provide sufficient evidence that this case was exceptional so as not to
grant a permanent injunction.'3 In addition, the Federal Circuit also
concluded that a permanent injunction should be equally available to those
who practice their inventions and to those who do not. 4
B. A Unanimous Supreme Court Reverses the Federal Circuit
From the outset, the Supreme Court pronounced that a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must first pass a traditional four-factor test in order to
comply with traditional principles of equity."' These factors are that: (1) the
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate compensation for that injury; (3)
balancing the hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant warrants an
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2005).
20 See id. at 712.
It Id.
12 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
13 See id. at 1339.
14 See id. ("Injunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice their patents, as
opposed to those who choose to license. The statutory right to exclude is equally available to both
groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should be equally available to both as
well. If the injunction gives the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence
of the right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend to compete in the
marketplace with potential infringers.").
is eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
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equitable remedy; and (4) a permanent injunction would not disserve the
public interest.
16
The Court concluded that Congress had shown no intent to depart from
traditional equitable practices for resolving disputes under the Patent Act.
17
Further, the Court adds that support for this principle is found in the Patent
Act itself, which indicates that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance
with principles of equity."
8
The Court also recognized that under the Patent Act, "patents shall have
the attributes of personal property." 9 Consistent with the attributes of
personal property, patent owners shall have "the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling" the invention.' The Federal
Circuit concluded that this statutory right to exclude favors issuance of
permanent injunctive relief. 21
Addressing the apparent discrepancy between these two statutes, one
pronouncing that patent owners shall have the right to exclude, and the
other leaving it to the lower court's discretion to issue permanent
injunctions, the Court looked to how permanent injunctions were treated
under the Copyright Act, where it found a refusal to replace traditional
equitable principles with automatic injunctions after a finding of copyright
infringement.' Similar to copyright law, the Court refused to endorse a rule
that requires issuing an injunction automatically upon a determination of
patent infringement.' Thus, the Court held that "the decision to grant or
deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed
by such standards."24 No longer is irreparable harm to the patent holder
presumed after a finding of infringement. The burden rests with the





19 Id. at 1840.
20 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (quoting 35 U.S.CA. § 154(a)(1)).
21 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
22 See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1841.
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1H. THE COURT'S DECISION IN EBAY SHIFTS PATENT LAW
TOWARDS LIABILITY RULE.
The Supreme Court's decision in eBay paves the way for a shift from the
traditional property-based liability rules to contract-based liability rules.
What are these rules and how did they function in the intellectual property
arena? What meaning does this shift have for the patent system?
A. The Traditional Views of Property and How They Apply to Intellectual
Property
In their 1972 article, Professor Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed argued that all legal entitlements are protected either by "property
rules" or by "liability rules." 25 Property rules are best described as a system
based on absolute permission rules, whereby a party cannot take property
without prior permission of the property right holder.26 The absolute right
holder sets the price of the entitlement. Most real property is protected by
this sort of framework.2' For example, an owner of a fee simple in real
property sets the price at which he is willing to sell his entitlement.
In contrast, liability rule is based on a take-now, pay-later system. These
rules allow non-owners to use the property, so long as they adequately
compensate its owner. In the Calabresi-Melamed framework, adequate
compensation is determined after the fact by a process known as "collective
valuation." 28 In their framework, it is the function of a court and jury to
determine what damages are adequate to compensate the entitlement
holder.29 The government's eminent domain power to take property, so
long as it pays just compensation, is a classic example of the liability rule.3°
Another example is that of a party breaching a contract, so long as it pays
damages after the fact.
However, unlike real property rights, intellectual property rights can be
used by more than one person simultaneously.3' As such, the result of the
liability rule in the patent context is that it becomes difficult for patent
25 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,1092 (1972).
26 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996).
27 Id. at 1302.
28 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 25, at 1109.
29 Merges, supra note 26, at 1302.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 1304.
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holders who are unwilling to sell or license their invention at market price
to "buy off" potential patent infringers (i.e. paying a potential infringer not
to infringe in order to maintain exclusivity).32
However, the liability rule does place a ceiling on the value of the
entitlement, usually set by the market in the form of a reasonable royalty.
33
But this may have a devastating effect on incentives to create for inventors
who do not receive adequate compensation from royalties.34
Additionally, applying the liability rule to patent rights poses a major
threat to the patent holder because of the long line of potential infringers.
In contrast to real property, where, for example, the holder of an easement
need only negotiate with the property owner and no one else, patent rights
differ considerably, in that there are many potential infringers, many of
whom might be in a position to take the entitlement.35 It is often difficult
for a patent holder to identify all the potential infringers, and even more
difficult to identify those who pose a serious threat to his entitlement.
36
These difficulties pose a major problem to patent holders who want to
maintain exclusivity to their entitlement.
For example, if word got out that one potential infringer was being paid
not to infringe a certain patent, it is likely that the number of people who
would then show interest in infringing that patent would skyrocket. 37 As a
result, it would become impossible for the patent holder to pay everyone not
to infringe. In addition, the number of infringers who either have no intent
to infringe or who pose no serious threat to the entitlement would increase.
However, in the easement example discussed above, the property owner
knows the identity of the serious threat and can buy him off.
Because of the long line of potential infringers, a liability rule in the
patent rights context will tend to create a ceiling on the value of the
entitlement. Assuming the entitlement holder is willing to license his right,
as more potential infringers bargain for the entitlement, the price of the
entitlement will gradually decrease as the entitlement loses its exclusivity.
Eventually, Congress may intervene and set the price of the entitlement in
the form of a compulsory license.38 For example, Congress may set a
reasonable royalty between 3% and 5% to compensate the patent holder. If









would affect the incentives of those to produce things covered by those
rights. Additionally, it is often difficult to calculate the exact value of the
entitlement, especially with patent rights that concern novel inventions.
Seemingly, one way to correct this problem would be to make the value
of the entitlement equal to the value the holder places on the entitlement.
If patent holders were to set the price for their entitlement, they could
transfer to whomever is willing to pay the most for it, and to those who are
willing to pay for it in advance. Those who take without paying would be
enjoined, which is the goal of the property rule.39
TV. EMERGING COMBINATORY TECHNOLOGIES FORCE A SHIFT
FROM PROPERTY RULE TO LIABILITY RULE.
While the property rule ensures maximum protection for patent rights,
it does have flaws that have become increasingly more visible, particularly
in the biomedical world.
Private property, often referred to as anti-commons property, emerged
as a response to the overuse of publicly shared scarce resources called
commons property. The "tragedy of the commons," as coined by Garrett
Hardin, is a metaphor that tries to explain overpopulation, air pollution, and
species extinction, which result when people use scarce resources with no
incentive to conserve. 40 A resource is prone to overuse in a tragedy of the
commons scenario when too many owners have a privilege to use a scarce
resource, and no one has the right to exclude.4'
Anti-commons property is best understood as the opposite of commons
property. In a "tragedy of the anti-commons" scenario, the government
gives too many people the right to exclude, resulting in the underutilization
of a resource. 42 The tragedy of the anti-commons refers to the obstacles that
arise when an inventor needs to combine technologies from multiple patents
to create a single useful product. 43 In the biomedical world, which may be
a microcosm for the overall problem of the growing proliferation of patent
rights, the tragedy of the anti-commons is felt in two ways; the patenting of
gene sequences and license stacking."
39 Id. at 1306.
40 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCi. 698, 698 (1998).
41 Id.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 699.
44 See id.
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A. There are Too Many Patents for Gene Sequences with No Apparent
Utility4s
In the 1980s, patents on gene sequences generally corresponded closely
to foreseeable commercial products. 46 However, beginning in the 1990s,
patents began to emerge on gene fragments with no identification of a
corresponding protein, biological function, or commercial products.
According to Professors Heller and Eisenberg, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) could have prevented the formation of the
resulting anti-commons in therapeutic gene technologies by requiring the
patent applicants to show a utility for these gene fragments before allowing
their patent claims.47 Whether a utility was shown before allowance of the
patent claims for gene fragments is immaterial now, as there are an
abundance of gene fragment patents. A search of the term "gene sequence"
in the USPTO database yields more than 200 patents.
As a result of the proliferation of patents on gene fragments, held by
different owners, researchers often must acquire multiple expensive licenses
to develop commercial products from these gene fragments.' Ifresearchers
are unable to procure a complete set of licenses, they must choose between
diverting resources to less promising endeavors, or proceeding with their
research based on incomplete information or without key components.49
Additionally, the long delays between filing an application with the
USPTO and the issuance of a patent (usually at least two years), often lead
to uncertainty in the biotech world as to the scope of patent rights that will
ultimately issue."0 Although no enforceable rights exist while a patent
application is pending at the USPTO, firms and universities often negotiate
and form license agreements over inchoate rights.
5
'
45 In order for an invention to be patentable it must be a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition ofmatter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. See 35 U.S.C.A. S 101 (2007). This
is known as the utility requirement, meaning the invention must produce a credible, tangible, and useful
result.
46 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 699.
47 See id. A patent claim is the written embodiment of how the patentee defines the invention.
The patent claim is the legally enforceable part of the patent, whereby in order to infringe a patent, the
infringer must infringe one of the patent claims. The claim language defines the scope of the patent
protection. When a patent examiner at the USPTO "allows" a claim it means that the claim is patentable.





B. Companies Must Now Stack Multiple Licenses To Be Able To Produce a
Single Commercial Product
A downstream biomedical invention often requires the use of multiple
upstream patents before its completion. Professor Shapiro describes this
"patent thicket" as a dense web of overlapping patent rights through which
a company must hack its way in order to commercialize new technology,
free from litigation. 2 As a result, upstream patent holders may make their
presence known early on in downstream developments in order to maintain
their rights to any downstream discoveries."3 The term "stacking" reflects the
fact that, from the prospective of the firm making the downstream product
in question, all of the different claims for royalties must be "stacked"
together to determine the total financial burden based on royalties, if the
firm is to sell their product free from patent litigation. 4
The threat ofan upstream patent holder obtaining an injunction, thereby
forcing the downstream producer to pull its product from the market is very
powerful. These threats greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially when
the license covers a small component of a popular or profitable commercial
product.5" Threats of injunctions often involve a very strong component of
"hold-up," a situation in which the defendant has already invested heavily
in a commercial product, and is ready to sell the product with the infringing
feature, but then holds up release of the product for fear of litigation.56 A
threat of an injunction often enables the patent holder to obtain a royalty far
in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution.
For example, in z4 Technologies5 7 the cost that Microsoft would have
incurred to design around z4's patent would have been exorbitant. As the
trial court pointed out, Microsoft would have needed to re-release Office
with 450 separate variations in 37 different languages, and Windows with
more than 600 separate variations in more than 40 languages.5" In reality, the
product activation software at issue in z4 was not a key component of either
Windows or Office, and the economic hardship incurred by Microsoft
52 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting,
in I INNOVATION POLICYANDTHEECONOMY 120 (AdamJaffeJoshua Lerner & Scott Stern, eds., MIT
Press 2001), available at http;//haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/thicket.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
53 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 46.
54 MarkA. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup andRoyalty Stacking, 85 TEx L. REV. 1991, 1993
(2007).
5s Id. at 1992-93.
% See id. at 1993.
57 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex 2006). For an in-depth
discussion of this case, see infra Part Vi.b.
58 See Id. at 442.
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would have been far greater than that incurred by z4, particularly because
Microsoft's continued infringement did not in any way prevent z4 from
selling its patented product activation software to other entities in the
market. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Microsoft did not produce
product activation software that it individually sold, distributed, or licensed
to other software manufacturers. 9
Additionally, the downstream company may not have been aware at the
time it designed its product that the patent asserted against it had been
issued. Patent applications take up to two years to issue, sometimes longer,
and for eighteen months after filing, an application is kept secret with the
USPTO. In some cases, the patent holder will engage in strategic delay or
concealment, knowing it will be in a stronger position once the downstream
product has incorporated the patented feature. 6'
C. The Proliferation of "Patent Trolls" May Have Caused the Court to
Revisit the Property Rule in the Patent Rights Context
Prior to eBay, the Federal Circuit created an all but mandatory
injunction standard.6 Traditionally, the rationale for routinely issuing
injunctions was based on the theory that patent law is a property rule, and
injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy, particularly in cases where the
patentee participates in the market and enforces its patent to preserve market
exclusivity. 62 However, the potential for injunctive relief against a product
with multiple components can and does permit so-called "patent trolls" to
hold up defendants by threatening to enjoin products that are predominantly
non-infringing. 6
In his amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the eBay case, Professor
Merges defines patent trolls as "entities whose primary purpose is to prey on
innovators who actually produce societally valuable products-abuse the
patent system by obtaining patents for the purpose of coercing settlements
from such innovators."64 Arguing in support of giving the trial courts wider
discretion to award injunctions, in order to limit the impact of patent trolls,
Merges goes on to write, "[t] he Court should make clear that Congress in
59 Id. at 440.
60 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1995.
61 See, e.g., Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
general rule [is] that an injunction should issue following an infringement verdict.").
62 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 2036.
63 Id.
64 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
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fact specifically intended trial courtjudges to posses and exercise that [equity
jurisdiction] authority."6'
But, how do patent trolls use the current patent system to ambush
potential inventors with deep pockets? According to Merges, they acquire
broad and nebulous patent claims from the USPTO that arguably
encompass existing technologies that wealthy companies already rely upon.6'
In a way, patent trolls operate like cyber squatters, sitting on potentially
valuable intellectual property without any intent to use or develop it.
Additionally, USPTO practices and procedures themselves may facilitate
trolls in obtaining patents to ambush companies. Professors Lemley and
Shapiro assert that the USPTO is "rationally ignorant" when it comes to the
objective validity of patents, because it is too costly for the USPTO to
discover all relevant prior art.67 Typically, a patent examiner at the USPTO
will spend about 18 hours per patent application, inclusive of time spent
searching the prior art, reading the relevant prior art, deciding whether the
patent application should be allowed by comparing the claims to the prior
art, and writing "Office Actions" explaining why some or all of the claims
should be rejected.' Simply put, 18 hours is not enough time to search the
plethora of prior art concerning the novelty of an invention and/or whether
the invention is obvious to those skilled in the art.69 Additionally, the
number of patent examiners at the USPTO has not kept pace with the
explosion in the number and complexity of patent applications.70
In addition, unscrupulous patent practitioners have become skilled at
manipulating the USPTO's procedures to create so-called "submarine
patents," whose existence stays hidden until a company has sunk irreversible
investment capital into infringing technology.7' In practice, patent trolls may
keep a submarine patent application alive at the USPTO for many years
repeatedly filing continuation applications.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 6.
67 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 1992. Prior art refers to all written publications,
patents, and patent application published before either the filing date ofthe patent application or the date
of invention.
68 Id. at5.
6 Novelty and non-obviousness of an invention, along with utility, define the standards that a
patent applicant must meet for his invention to be patentable. For specific requirements, see 35 U.S.CA
SS 102-103 (2007).
70 See BriefofAmicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc., supra note 63, at 8-10.
71 Id. at 9. Patents that languish in the USPTO are often called "submarine patents," because
traditionally, patent applications were not published by the USPTO and thus were hidden from potential
companies.
2007]
12 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1
Typically, a patent applicant gets two or three metaphorical "bites at the
apple" to convince the patent examiner at the USPTO that the applicant's
invention is patentable. This is done by responding to rejections made by
the examiner in the form of amendments to the claims or persuasively
arguing to traverse the examiner's rejection. After the patent examiner issues
a final rejection of the application claims, the applicant may file a request for
continued examination (RCE), and thereby have more opportunities to
continue prosecuting the application. 72
As a result, a patent practitioner may keep his client's application alive
for several years by filing several RCEs. As such, a savvy patent practitioner
may keep his client's patent lurking and waiting for a company to invest a
substantial amount of money into a product that will infringe the potential
patent. Once a company becomes financially committed to the infringing
product, the patent applicant allows the patent to issue, and then like a troll
leaping from underneath a bridge demanding a toll, the patent applicant
emerges with the newly issued patent and demands royalties.
Prior to November 29, 2000, patent applications were typically not
published, and therefore there was no way for a firm to detect a submarine
patent. However, new rules require that all patent applications filed after
November 29,2000 be published by the USPTO eighteen months from the
effective filing date.73 This requirement will help firms search for potential
submarine patents that stand as barriers to the development of new
technology.
The Blackberry case is a prime example of how a patent troll can rear its
ugly head and why a property rule in patent law can have devastating effects.
In that case, the plaintiff NTP did not make, sell, or offer for sale, a
competing wireless device such as a Blackberry.74 However, the threat of an
injunction forced Research in Motion to settle for the amount of $612.5
million, nearly 18 times the jury award of damages.75 Had this case been
72 See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE S 706.07(h) (8th ed., rev. 5 2006) [hereinafter MPEP]. As of November 1,
2007, new patent rules regarding the number of continuation applications and RCEs per application will
be limited to two continuations and one RCE as of right per patent application. See Changes to Practice
for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
1). The new rules also permit an applicant to file a petition to request for more than one RCE. So, the
effect of the new rules on submarine patents may not be known for some time.
73 See MPEP, supra note 72, S 1120.
74 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEUS 26837, at *2 (E.D. Va.,
Aug. 5, 2003).
75 Id. (The jury awarded compensatory damages at a royalty rate of 5.7% in the amount of
$33,446,172.).
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decided post eBay, it is likely the settlement agreement would have been for
far less.
The Federal Circuit concluded in its decision in eBay that the additional
leverage patent trolls hold in licensing and settlement agreements is a natural
consequence of the right to exclude and, not an inappropriate reward to a
patent holder.76 However, professors Lemley and Shapiro argue that the
additional leverage comes from the patent owner's ability to capture value
that has nothing to do with the invention at issue, and subsequently the
accused infringer cannot separate the infringing components from the non-
infringing components after the fact.'
V. THE EQUITABLE DISCRETION TEST GivEs COURTS THE POWER
TO LIMIT THE IMPACT THAT PATENT TROLLS HAVE ON THE
PATENT SYSTEM
Perhaps in response to critics of the Federal Circuit's decision to
automatically grant injunctions in patent cases, the Supreme Court decided
to go in a different direction with its decision in eBay, the Supreme Court
held that the trial court has the "equitable discretion" whether to issue an
injunction in a patent infringement case.78
But what should the determining factors be in a court's decision to
award an injunction? Merges argues there are two determinative factors
which a court must consider when determining whether a patent holder is
entitled to injunctive relief.79
The first factor is the nature of the patent holder itself, and whether it
is in the business of litigating instead of innovating. The second factor is
whether the patent holder engaged in troll like behavior to increase the
settlement value of his claim.'
With respect to the first factor, the nature of the patent holder, Merges
asserts that patent trolls exist primarily to tax innovation rather than engage
in it because they do not produce anything; therefore, they should not be
rewarded with injunctions that prevent inventions.8' However, it may be
false to assume that just because a patent holder does not practice the
invention that he could have practiced the invention, ab initio, when the
76 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
77 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 54, at 2010.
78 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
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patent was granted. This assumption may overlook the main distinction
between the patentability of an invention and the infringement of a patent.82
To illustrate the difference between the patentability ofan invention and
the infringement of a patent, suppose inventor X holds a patent that claims
an invention comprising features A, B, and C. Now suppose inventor Y
obtains a patent claiming an invention comprising features A, B, C, and D.
X's patent does not anticipate Ys patent because it does not disclose feature
D; therefore, Y is entitled to a patent for his invention (assuming it is not
rendered obvious). However, ifX used the word "comprising" in his claim
language (as is most often done), any invention that has features A, B, or C,
(even if the invention contains more features, such as inventor Ys
invention), infringes onX's patent.s3 Therefore, simply because an inventor
is entitled to a patent does not automatically mean he can practice that
invention without infringing another patent.
Perhaps Merges presupposes that, because a patent holder does not
practice his invention, and may be unwilling to license it, the inventor could
have practiced the invention free from infringing other patents. This
supposition may be incorrect at times. While it may be true that many
inventors do not intend to practice their invention, it might be too difficult
a task for a court to determine who is a bona fide patent holder with intent
to promote science, and who is a troll with the intent to promote profit.
Additionally, patents are enforceable twenty years from the effective
filing date of the patent application. 8 Presumably, this gives an inventor
ample time to decide how to use his or her property and if and when they
want to enter the market. If a court denies a permanent injunction early in
the effective life of a patent, the patent holder's decision to enter the market
is virtually made for him by the court, as he will be forced to license his
invention to an infringer. This would be akin to a court forcing the owner
of beachfront property to allow a hotel resort company to build a hotel on
the property, simply because the owner has not done something with the
property as of a certain date.
The second factor Merges suggests, looking at the troll like behavior of
the patent holder, is more readily ascertainable by the courts. The
prosecution history81 of a patent application is kept on file with the USPTO
and is accessible to the public after 18 months. If the patent holder
82 For further information on claim construction and patentability, see ROBERT C. FABER,
LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (5th ed. 2003).
83 See MPEP, supra note 72, S 2111.03
s4 35 U.S.CA. S 154(a)(2) (2007).
85 The prosecution history of a patent application means all the paperwork, responses,
amendments, and correspondence between the USPTO and the patent agent or attorney prosecuting
the application.
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strategically delayed his application from issuing, this may show up in the
prosecution history of the patent. Additionally, if the patent holder delayed
bringing a lawsuit against an alleged infringer to maximize his profits, the
prosecution history may show when the patent holder first learned of the
infringement and should have brought suit. Although it might be a stretch
to apply the doctrine of laches to a patent applicant's strategic delay in
allowing his patent to issue, it is certainly an argument that should be raised
in an infringement action. Thus, the equities tip in favor of the accused
infringer who may have been ambushed by the patent holder after investing
large sums of money in the infringing product.
Whether the Court incorporated Merges's suggestions into eBay is
unclear, but the current factors promulgated by the Court clearly leave a lot
of equitable discretion with the trial court.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE EBAY DISCRETIONARY TEST IN THE
DISTRICT COURTS REVEALS DIFFERENT DECISIONS FOR DIFFERENT
INDUSTRIES
Following the eBay decision, the district courts grappled with the
application of the Court's four-factor test when deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief. The following is a sampling of several district court
opinions following the eBay decision, specific to certain technological
industries. Because of the infrequency of patent litigation and the
infrequency of decisions being rendered by courts in patent cases, the
following cases provide good statistical evidence of how the district courts
are proceeding under the new equitable injunction test.86
A. Mechanical Tools (KEG Technologies, Inc. v. Laimer)
KEG Technologies filed suit against Laimer for infringing two of KEG's
patents. The court eventually entered a defaultjudgment in favor of KEG. 7
Turning toward the issue of injunctive relief, the court stated that had it
been operating under the Federal Circuit's rule that an injunction
automatically follows a finding of infringement, KEG would have been
entitled to such an injunction.8 8 However, while this case was pending, the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay, rejecting the Federal Circuit's
86 Mark LemleyRational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw.U. L. REv. 1495,1501(2001) ("[1]t
is reasonable to estimate that at most only about two percent ofall patents are ever litigated, and less than
two-tenths of one percent of all issued patents actually go to court.").
87 KEG Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
88 Id.
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rule, and thus the plaintiff had to satisfy the four part equity test to get
injunctive relief's
The court found that KEG had not satisfied the second and third
elements of the test (monetary damages and balancing the hardships of the
plaintiff and defendant).'
Importantly, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing so that both sides
could introduce evidence in regards to KEG's motion for injunctive relief.
This holding raises the burden placed on the plaintiff to satisfy the four
factor test, as the plaintiffs injuries are no longer a rebuttable presumption.
Additionally, litigation costs will be greatly increased in order for the injured
party to obtain an injunction, which may encourage parties to settle the
lawsuit for a royalty rather than risk not getting an injunction.
B. Software (z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft)
z4 owned a patent for product activation software. It filed suit against
Microsoft, claiming that the product activation software Microsoft used in
Office and Windows infringed its patent. A jury found that Microsoft's
software products did indeed infringe z4's patent. Subsequently, z4 asked
the court to enjoin Microsoft from making, using, or selling any products
that use product activation software.91
The court rejected z4's contention that a finding of infringement
necessarily results in a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff has suffered
irreparable harm. The plaintiff must satisfy all the elements of the four
factor test .92 However, the difficultly in satisfying the four factor test is
evinced by the court's analysis of each factor.
93
The court cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay as support for the
proposition that if the infringed invention is a small component of the
product the infringing party wishes to produce, then, monetary damages
may be sufficient compensation.94 Because the product activation software
is not related to the core functionality of the programs for which consumers
purchase the products, the court concluded that monetary damages would
be appropriate. 9 In addition, the court concluded that calculating an
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See z4 Teths., Inc. v. Microsof Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 438, 439 (E.D. TeL 2006).
92 Id.
9 Id. at 439-44.
9 Id. at 441.
95 Id.
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"appropriate royalty" would not be difficult based on sales of the previous
versions of the Microsoft products.'
The "small component" test promulgated by the court may be a
workable doctrine in cases where the product as a whole is functional
without the infringing component, as in the case of product activation
software; Windows and Office would still function even if they did not have
activation software. Thus, the true inquiry should not be whether the
infringing component is small relative to the entire product, but whether the
product as a whole is functional without the infringing component. Whether
the component is small or large is irrelevant. If the product is functional
without the infringing component, then in most cases an injunction would
be inappropriate because the patented invention and the infringing product
would not compete in the same market. For example, excluding Windows
or Office from the market would not increase sales of z4's product activation
software because consumers purchase Office for entirely different purposes
than for the use of the product activation software.
Additionally, the court recognized that an injunction would force
Microsoft to remove their infringing products from the market and to design
around the infringed patent.97 Forcing Microsoft to remove Office from the
market would be a disservice to the public, the fourth factor in the test.
Admittedly, there are other comparable products to Microsoft Office
that consumers could purchase. However, the public is so dependant upon
Microsoft products that, although it is impossible to predict the actual harm
to the public, the potential harm should weigh in favor against an injunction.
C. Biomedical Devices (Voda v. Cordis Corp.)
In this case, Dr. Jan Voda, sued Cordis Corp. for infringing his patented
angioplasty guide catheter.9" Thejury returned a verdict in favor ofDr. Voda
and awarded a reasonable royalty rate of 7.5% of defendant's gross sales of
the infringing catheters. At the conclusion of the trial, he moved for a
permanent injunction against Cordis. Dr. Voda did not make, sell, or offer
for sale his patented invention, but instead exclusively licensed the invention
to Scimed, who manufactured the catheters. 99
The court relied on eBay and concluded that a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must show harm to himself, rather than relying on alleged
9 Id. at 442.
9 See id.
98 Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006).
99 See id. at *6.
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harm to a non-party."° The harm felt by an exclusive licensee is irrelevant,
particularly because Scimed elected not to sue to enforce the patent rights.''
Not only does Voda reinforce the eBay decision by requiring the plaintiff to
show irreparable harm, but showing harm to an exclusive licensee is
insufficient to show irreparable harm to the patent holder.
D. Digital Media (TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communication)
The plaintiff TiVo brought suit against Echostar Communication for
several claims of patent infringement of its DVR technology.' 2 After ajury
awarded TiVo over $73 million in damages, TiVo moved the court for entry
of a permanent injunction.'03
The district court concluded that TiVo must satisfy the four factor test
promulgated by the Supreme Court in eBay to receive injunctive relief" 4
Regarding the first and second factors, TiVo argued that because Echostar
directly competed against TiVo and specifically targeted TiVo customers,
monetary damages would be insufficient to compensate for TiVo's loss in
customers. s05 TiVo also produced evidence to show that customers tended
to stay with their current DVR service providers;'0 6 as such, TiVo argued
that the result in market share loss will result in an irreparable harm. 7
As for the third factor, TiVo argued that the balance of hardships
weighed heavily in its favor. TiVo's principle argument was that because its
business is entirely dependant upon DVR technology, it would "become
extinct" if it could not exploit that market.' 8 In contrast, Echostar's primary
business is satellite transmission technology, which would be unaffected by
an injunction.' 9 Regarding the fourth factor, TiVo asserted that the public
interest would be disserviced ifEchostar was allowed to continue infringing,
and that strong patent rights serve the public interest."0
100 Id. at *5 ("As patents have 'the attributes of personal property', the person seeking a permanent
injunction must demonstrate harm from the infringement of those rights that is personal as well.").
101 Id.
102 TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
103 Id. at 665.
104 Id. at 666.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 667.
107 Id. at 666-67.




Based on TiVo's arguments, the court concluded that a permanent
injunction was warranted.' Its decision to award a permanent injunction
may be a rarity in patent litigation cases after eBay, because monetary relief
is often sufficient to compensate the injured party. TiVo was able to get a
permanent injunction because their sole product was in direct competition
with the infringing product. If TiVo made additional products or had not
practiced their patent for DVR, it is unlikely that they would have awarded
injunctive relief based on the eBay factors.
VII. THE PUBLIC INTEREST FACTOR ALLOWS TRIAL COURTS TO
ISSUE INJUNCTIONS TO PROMOTE THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
In TiVo, the district court was persuaded by arguments for injunctive
relief, and concluded that a permanent injunction was warranted." 2 One of
the court's key pronouncements concerned the public interest factor. The
court wrote:
The public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent system.
This interest is served by enforcing an adequate remedy for patent
infringement-in this case, a permanent injunction. The infringing
products are not related to any issue of public health or any other
equally key interest; they are used for entertainment.
11 3
Is the district court asserting that injunctive relief is more readily
available for those inventions that are not related to public health? Is
injunctive relief always not in the best interest of the public when it
concerns issues of public health?
The pharmaceutical industry serves as an example of when injunctive
relief might best serve the public interest in public health cases, because
pharmaceutical companies often require injunctive relief to fight off
infringers for their very survival. According to Professor Lemley, the
pharmaceutical industry considers patent protection far more important to
their research and development efforts than do other technology
industries," 4 because pharmaceutical companies spend millions of dollars
III Id. at 669.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 670.
114 MarkA. Lemley, Patent Reform Legislation-Public Comments on Substitute H.R. 2795 and
the Role of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Oct. 24,2005, http.//www.amc.gov/commission_
hearings/pdfStatementLemley.pdf
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developing and marketing new products, but only see returns on a fraction
of those products."' Infrequent blockbuster drugs produce the great
majority of a pharmaceutical company's revenue." 6 Therefore, the success
of the pharmaceutical industry is critically dependent on protecting revenue
streams generated by blockbuster products."' Moreover, the high cost of
producing new pharmaceuticals substantially reduces the number of
companies with sufficient resources to engage in innovative research.'18 This
means fewer pharmaceutical companies producing fewer new drugs.
So why should the public interest weigh in favor of injunctive relief for
pharmaceutical patents? First, a pharmaceutical patent will often encompass
the entire drug, whereas a patent for a biomedical invention might be for
one component of a device amongst thousands." 9 Therefore, companies
with pharmaceutical patents do not have to worry about the endless stream
of patent infringers, 2 ' because the only potential infringers are those with
sufficient resources to produce the entire drug covered by the patent.'2 '
Because patents for pharmaceuticals usually cover the entire drug,
permanent injunctions will force pharmaceutical companies to design
around the issued patent. A classic example of how "design around"
products function in the pharmaceutical world is Pfizer's® patent for
Viagra@. Viagra@ is the trade name for sildenafil citrate, a pharmaceutical
patented by Pfizer@ for the treatment of erectile dysfunction." Perhaps the
fear of injunctive relief, forced Pfizer'sO competitors to design around the
Viagra@ patent. As a result, two pharmaceuticals, Levitra@ and Cialis®, hit
the market soon after Viagra@, which offer substantially the same medicinal
benefit as Viagra@. These new drugs offer consumers multiple choices for
therapy, as each drug consists of a different chemical formula and may have
different side effects.
The alternative would be to let companies produce generic drugs
without any regard for patented pharmaceuticals. This result would be
devastating, as pharmaceutical companies would no longer make the profits
needed to create new pharmaceuticals. Moreover, there would be no
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to disclose chemical formulas to the
FDA or the USPTO for fear of competitors profiting from their labor. New
11s Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of
Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689,724 (2006).
116 Id. at 724.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Lemley, supra note 115, at 1, 2.
120 See supra Section III-a.
121 See Thomas, supra note 116.
122 See U.S. Patent No. 6,469,012 (filed Mar. 4, 1996).
PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
drugs would hit the market with much less frequency, and as a result, fewer
generics would be available.
Furthermore, if district courts were to routinely reject permanent
injunctions and order compulsory licenses in pharmaceutical patent
infringement cases, generic companies would virtually freeload off the
patent holder's labor. Not only would generic companies be able to bypass
expensive costs associated with research and development, they could also
fast-track FDA approval for generic drugs based on the prior approval of the
infringed pharmaceutical. Additionally, the generic nature of the drug
assumes that it is in direct competition with the patented, name-brand drug.
As such, it follows that the infringed party should be able to prove
irreparable harm resulting from the introduction of a generic drug that
directly competes against the patented drug.
Seemingly, the only equitable solution would be to enjoin infringers of
pharmaceutical patents. Several months after eBay, the Federal District
Court for the District of Delaware awarded a permanent injunction to
Novozymes, a plaintiff with a patent for alpha-amylase enzymes that are
used for the production of ethanol fuel, a burgeoning industry that is an
alternative to traditional fossil fuels.123  Novozymes was awarded a
reasonable royalty as damages and then moved the district court for
permanent injunctive relief.124  Citing eBay, the court concluded that
Novozymes satisfied the four factor test and subsequently issued an
injunction against the defendant Genecor.'25 Regarding the irreparable harm
factor, the district court concluded that because Novozymes exclusively
licensed its patent to a subsidiary, with the expectation that the value of the
subsidiary would increase with successful marketing of the technology,
Novozymes would suffer irreparable harm, even though it did not market
the patented product itself. 126 Interestingly, the court concluded that the loss
of the right to exclude is irreparable harm. 27 However, were this blanket
rule to apply in all cases, federal courts would again find themselves at the
old Federal Circuit rule, that an injunction should issue as a matter of right
whenever a patent is found to have been infringed.
123 See Novozymes v. Genecor Int'l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 (D. Del. 2007).
124 Id. at 595.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Nevertheless, the court in Novozymes pointed out that when direct
competitors are involved, the injured party "has a right, granted by Congress,
not to assist its rival with the use of proprietary technology." 128 And that is
the crux of the patent game. If a party patents and practices an invention, for
a limited time that party should not have to share its intellectual property
with competitors. However, when a party misuses its patent to tax other
innovating parties, or to hold up an invention because one of the thousands
of parts infringes a patent, it should not be able to stop others from
practicing that invention.
As illustrated in this article, burgeoning technologies across a diverse
group of industries forced the Supreme Court to give more power to lower
courts in fashioning equitable remedies. No longer will a blanket rule of
enjoinment reign over the patent system; instead a discretionary rule will
give courts the power to weigh all the evidence and fashion an equitable
remedy in infringement cases.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay states it best: "[i]n cases
now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent
holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases."' 29 Time will tell
how the courts respond to these new diverse technologies; however, the
Court's new discretionary power in patent cases should promote and
encourage more growth in the sciences.
128 Id. at 613.
129 eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
